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CONFRONTING OUR SHARED LEGACY OF INCONGRUOUS
LAND OWNERSHIP: NOTES FOR A RESEARCH AGENDA
FEDERICO CHEEVER
t
What we're saying today is that you're either part of the solution or
you're part of the problem.'
INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem
Concepts of ownership in the American west have, quite literally, a
checkered past.
In a broad band across southwestern Wyoming, northern Utah, cen-
tral Nevada and the mountains of eastern California, 640-acre sections of
federal government land are still arranged in a checkerboard pattern with
alternating 640-acre sections of private land. This strange ownership
pattern has nothing to do with the contours of the landscape and nothing
to do with the traditions or aspirations of the human communities, native
and non-native, who have bound themselves to that hard country. The
Union Pacific/Central Pacific railroad "checkerboard" is a relic of a po-
litical deal designed to finance a transcontinental railroad, which was
once the technological marvel of the world and now a curiosity of inter-
est to no one but historians, railroad buffs, and the corporations who
transport coal and other large-volume, low-priced goods.2
Although the largest, the Union Pacific/Central Pacific checker-
board is only one of the West's railroad checkerboards. During the nine-
teenth century, the federal government granted more than 94 million
acres of land to railroads.
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1. Robert Sheer, Introduction to ELDRIDGE CLEAVER: POST-PRISON WRITINGS AND
SPEECHES xxxii (Robert Sheer ed. 1969) (quoting speech by Eldridge Cleaver to the San Francisco
Barristers' Club).
2. STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NOTHING LIKE IT IN THE WORLD: THE MEN WHO BUILT THE
TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD 1863-69, 77-81 (2000).
3. PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 385 (1968).
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Western New Mexico contains another kind of checkerboard, less
regular and more complicated than the railroad checkerboard. The Na-
vajo "checkerboard reservation" contains unequal chunks of Bureau of
Land Management, state, private and Navajo tribal land.4 Like the rail-
road checkerboard, the boxy section-by-section ownership configuration
of the checkerboard reservation has little to do with the contours of the
landscape or the aspirations of the residents. The Navajo checkerboard
is not the only checkerboard reservation. Most western states contain
Indian reservations whittled down or hollowed out by the allotment acts
of the late nineteenth century. As Justice Scalia recently put it:
In the late 19th century, the prevailing national policy of segregating
lands for the exclusive use and control of the Indian tribes gave way
to a policy of allotting those lands to tribe members individually.
The objectives of allotment were simple and clear cut: to extinguish
tribal sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries, and force the assimi-
lation of Indians into the society at large.
6
Between 1887 and 1934, Indian title dwindled from 138 million
acres (an area larger than California and New York combined) to 48 mil-
lion acres (an area about the size of Oklahoma). 7 With the Indian Reor-
ganization Act of 1934,8 the federal government abandoned the policy,
but the property rights remained. Indian tribes lost roughly 90 million
acres of land between 1887 and 1934, roughly the same amount of land
granted to railroads. 9
The railroad checkerboards and the checkerboard reservations are
not aberrations on the landscape of the American West. Rather, they are
extreme but emblematic examples of our "history of ownership." In the
"West,"' 0 land ownership has regularly been employed as a tool of gov-
ernment policy. To further goals articulated in the halls of Congress, and
to a much lesser degree in statehouses, our governments have been will-
ing to buy land, sell land, sell land cheaply and give land away. At the
same time, in furtherance of the same goals or related ones, our govern-
ments have been willing to deprive long time possessors and recognized
4. See BLM Surface Management Responsibility Map, New Mexico (1994) 1:5000,000.
5. See Sarah Krakoff, Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic
Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REv. 1109, 1185-88 (2004).
6. County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 253 (1992).
7. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 15.07[1][a], at 1009 (Nell J. Newton et
al. eds., 2005).
8. Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act), ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000)).
9. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, PUBLIC LAND
STATISTICS, Table 1-2 (2004), http://www.blm.gov/natacq/plsO4/plsl-2 04.pdf (hereinafter PUBLIC
LAND STATISTICS).
10. See Clyde A. Milner, Introduction to THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 1-7
(Clyde A. Milner et al. eds. 1994).
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legal owners of some or all of their rights to land with compensation,
with limited compensation, or without any compensation at all."
B. Ownership as a Tool of Policy
Property maps of the American West are littered with the detritus of
policies once thought essential for the expansion, survival or honor of the
nation, but are now largely forgotten.
Every western state contains thousands of acres once transferred
into private ownership for nothing under the Homestead Act and Stock-
Raising Homestead Act (287,500,000 acres) 12, and the Desert Lands Act
(10,700,000 acres), 13 or for almost nothing under the Timber Culture Act
(10,900,000 acres) 14 and Timber and Stone Act (13,900,000 acres).' 5
From 1862, a heady mixture of state donation act tradition, an egalitarian
National Land Reform Movement, and a desire to bind the West more
closely to the Union during the Civil War prompted the federal govern-
ment to give land away to claimants who had fulfilled residency re-
quirements and submitted minimal paperwork.
16
The homestead laws and the settlement they encouraged did many
things, good and bad. Among these things was the settlement and tilling
of millions of acres of land in the "Great Plow-Up. ' 17 In the long run,
much of this land could not support the communities encouraged to
claim them under generous federal laws.' 8 The property rights remain.
Many, if not most, surveyed townships in western states still contain
one, two or three sections of state land granted by the federal govern-
ment for support of the common schools (77,630,000 acres), 19 universi-
ties, hospitals, prisons and more (21,700,000 acres).20 In most states,
these sections now provide only a tiny amount of the money needed to
run modem schools, land-grant universities, and prisons. For example,
in fiscal year 2006, revenues from state school-grant lands are projected
to provide $31 million (1.1 percent) of Colorado's $2.8 billion school
budget.2'
11. See infra text accompanying notes 12-37.




16. See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 393-96 (1968). See
also Wendy McElroy, The Free-Soil Movement, FREEDOM DAILY, May 2001, available at
http://www.fff.org/freedom/0501 e.asp.
17. DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES: NATURE AND HISTORY IN THE AMERICAN
WEST 98-99 (1992).
18. See generally JONATHAN RABAN, BAD LAND: AN AMERICAN ROMANCE (1996).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. State of Colorado, Office of the State Auditor, State Board of Land Commissioners Per-
formance Audit (Nov. 2005), http://www.state.co.us/auditor (follow "OSA Audit Reports" hyper-
link; then follow "By Department/Entity" hyperlink; then follow "Natural Resources" hyperlink);
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New Mexico, Arizona, California and southern Colorado contain a
range of ownership configurations that memorialize our struggle with our
national promise in the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo to respect property
rights granted by Spain and Mexico before the United States' conquest of
the Southwest. Millions of acres were confirmed through a bewildering
variety of congressionally sanctioned processes; millions more were re-
jected, justly and unjustly.22 Decisions of the California Land Commis-
sion made under the California Land Settlement Act of 185123 and the
New Mexico Court of Private Land Claims authorized by Congress in
189124 confirmed title to huge tracts of land across present day Califor-
nia, Arizona, and New Mexico. Congress, through direct congressional
confirmations of title, confirmed another nine million acres, including
the million-acre Sangre de Cristo Grant in southern Colorado and north-
em New Mexico.25 As important are the tens-of-millions of acres of land
for which these confirmation processes rejected claims.26 In many cases,
Hispanic communities, particularly in northern New Mexico, have never
accepted these deprivations.27
While these efforts were originally intended to protect the rights of
actual former Mexican citizens, through the passage of time, title has
passed to people and corporations who have no connection to the South-
west's Mexican past. In recent decades, the United States Supreme
Court's most ringing endorsement of "special rights" for title descended
see also Colorado State Land Board, http://www.trustlands.state.co.us/Documents/Questions/
General.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2006) (total funding to Colorado schools generated from school
trust lands in 2003-2004 was $57.9 million); PAUL TESKE, STEPPING UP OR BOTTOMING OUT?
FUNDING COLORADO'S SCHOOLS 6 (2005), http://www.dkfoundation.org/PDFs/
TeskeFullReport.pdf (total funding for Colorado's K-12 schools in 2003 was $4.2 billion). See
also Branson Sch. Dist. v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 626-27 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding a Colorado
voter initiative which changed management of land-grant lands for schools from "maximum
amount" for public schools to "reasonable and consistent income.").
22. Malcolm Ebright, Introduction to SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANTS AND THE LAW 3,
3-11 (Malcolm Ebright ed. 1989); See also Federico Cheever, A New Approach to Spanish and
Mexican Land Grants and the Public Trust Doctrine. Defining the Property Interest Protected by the
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1364, 1381-85 (1986).
23. Califomia Land Settlement Act of 1851, ch. 41, 9 Stat. 631 (1851).9 Stat. 631 (1851).
24. Act of Mar. 3, 185 1, ch. 539, 26 Stat. 854 (establishing a court of private land claims, and
providing for settlement of private land claims in certain States and Territories).
25. Ryan Golten, Lobato v. Taylor: How the Villages of the Rio Culebra, the Colorado Su-
preme Court, at the Restatement of Servitudes Bailed Out the Treaty of Guadulupe Hidalgo, 45 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 457 (2005); Gregory Hicks & Devon G. Pefia, Community Acequis in Colorado s Rio
Culebra Watershed: A Customary Commons in the Domain of Prior Appropriation, 74 U. COLO. L.
R. 387 (2003).
26. Cheever, supra note 22, at 1381-89.
27. MALCOLM EBRIGHT, THE TIERRA AMARILLA GRANT: A HISTORY OF CHICANERY 28
(1980). For an extensive discussion, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TREATY OF
GUADALUPE HIDALGO: FINDINGS AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING
COMMUNITY LAND GRANT CLAIMS IN NEW MEXICO (June 2004),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO459.pdf.
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from Mexican grants favored by Howard Hughes' Summa Corporation
on land near Marina Del Rey in Los Angeles County. 
2 8
Millions of acres of the remaining public domain and quite a lot of
private land are criss-crossed or perforated by patented mining claims
under the General Mining Act of 1872, and rights-of-way under a long
ago repealed law generally known as Revised Statute 2477.29 As scholar
Bret Birdsong put it in a recent article:
For 110 years, from its enactment in 1866 until its repeal in 1976,
this obscure statute known as R.S. 2477 granted the right-of-way
across unreserved federal public lands for the construction of high-
ways. For most of its lifetime, the terse and obscure grant caused lit-
tle stir, except for the occasional claim that now private lands are
subject to R.S. 2477 rights-of-way established during earlier public
ownership. Since its repeal, however, R.S. 2477 has become a flash-
point in the ongoing battle for control over western public lands and
the resources they harbor. Throughout the West, states, counties, and
even individuals. and groups pushing for unrestricted motorized ac-
cess to remote public lands are using R.S. 2477 to try to frustrate en-
vironmentally protective measures imposed by federal land
30managers ....
The prairies from Texas to Montana contain irregular jumbles of
government land-the national grasslands-originally created to further
farmers' relief and soil conservation. As mentioned above, the Home-
stead Act of 1862 and similar laws brought millions of settlers to the
prairies. The land could not support them. After the First World War,
sod, which should never have been broken, had been plowed up. 3' When
the dry years came, the land yielded its topsoil to the incessant wind.
The Dust Bowl came to Oklahoma, Texas, Wyoming, Nebraska, Kansas,
Colorado and the Dakotas.32
Ten-foot drifts of fine soil particles piled up like snow in a blizzard,
burying fences and closing roads . . . Emergency measures were
taken to save the farmers and settlers. The National Industrial Re-
covery Act of 1933 and the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act of
1935 allowed the federal government to purchase and restore dam-
aged lands and to resettle destitute families. From these disastrous
28. Summa Corp. v. California, 466 U.S. 198, 209 (1984) (holding title descended from
Mexican claims not subject to California's otherwise universal public trust easement).
29. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST 20, 28-74 (1992); see also HIGHWAY ROBBERY: HOW A LOOPHOLE IN AN
OUTDATED AND REPEALED ROAD STATUTE THREATENS OUR NATIONAL PARKS, MONUMENTS, AND
OTHER SPECIAL PLACES - ONE MILE AT A TIME, http://www.highway-robbery.org/documents/
Robbery.pdf.
30. Bret Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S. 2477: Judicial and Administrative Responsibility for
Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 524 (2005).
31. See DONALD WORSTER, UNDER WESTERN SKIES 93-105 (1992).
32. See TIMOTHY EGAN, THE WORST HARD TIME: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THOSE WHO
SURVIVED THE GREAT AMERICAN DUST BowL 145-330 (2005).
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days, a hundred years after the Homestead Act on June 23, 1960, the
National Grasslands were born.
33
The often ignored national grasslands contain four million acres of
land.
3 4
Even some of the great national reservations, the National Forests
and Bureau of Land Management holdings, were created to further poli-
cies that have long since dropped off any legislative agenda. The fear of
"timber famine," so important in establishing the national forests, 35 now
rarely comes to mind. The forage preserved by the Taylor Grazing Act
3 6
fattens an inconsequential three percent of the nation's beef.
37
We do not regularly think of all these manipulations of ownership at
the same time or in the same way. We, like the legislators who author-
ized those manipulations, tend to approach the western landscape the-
matically. We see only those things relevant to what we happen to be
looking for: Hispanic rights, biodiversity, Native American rights, water
supply, and minerals, among other things. But, of course, the western
landscape is not arranged thematically.
The property ownership manipulations of the past two centuries
seem breathtakingly arrogant. As anyone could have told the idealistic,
sovereign agents of the past-whether Civil War Republican, early twen-
tieth century Progressive, or New Deal Democrat-the property rights
have outlasted the policies they were designed to support.
C. Life Among the Ruins
In the inland West, we live among a jumble of grants and claims,
recognized and inchoate, created or suppressed to serve long-abandoned
and half-forgotten policies. We live like medieval Romans, 38 building
cooking fires in the ruined coliseum. The vast ruins around us are linked
in our minds to our strong moral reaction for the reasons that brought
them into being.
33. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, National Grasslands,
http://www.fs.fed.us/grasslands/aboutus/index.shtm, (last visited Apr. 5, 2006); see also National
Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933); Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, ch. 48-
49,49 Stat. 115 (1935); 36 C.F.R. § 213.1 (2006) (regulations establishing the National Grasslands).
34. See U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Forest Service, supra note 33.
35. See GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION (Kessinger Publishing 2004)
(1910), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/11238/11238-8.txt.
36. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2000)).
37. National Public Lands Grazing Campaign, Economic Facts of Public Lands Grazing
(2004), http://www.publiclandsranching.org/htmlres/PDF/FS- Grazing-Economics.PDF.
38. In the early Middle Ages Visigoths and Vandals invaded and sacked Rome. Paula J.
Howarth, Villa Aldobrandini on the Quirinal Hill in Rome (Jun. 1996),
http://www.paulahowarth.com/villa/e-04.htm. Political troubles, with Byzantines, the Lombards, the
establishment of the Holy Roman Empire, and conflicts between the papacy further humbled the
"eternal city." Id. The city was depopulated. Id. The remaining inhabitants dwelt mainly on the
Campus Martius, the low-lying part of the city near the Tiber River. Id. They erected modest dwell-
ings among the monumental buildings of Imperial Rome, by then in ruins. Id.
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It barely requires proof that "life among the ruins" is less than per-
fect. Indian tribes work to regain land and sovereignty lost in the name
of long discredited policies. 39  Hispanic communities try to piece to-
gether rights to coherent territories to support community life and tradi-
tion.40 Wilderness advocates battle over rights of way-crumbling
wagon ruts to long abandoned mines and reservoir sites.41 Unused min-
ing claims frustrate public land planning.42 High plains farmers try to
maintain dwindling communities on land grandly granted to them to set-
tle the West.43  Ranchers in Powder River country discover that Con-
gress's failure to grant them mineral rights to their ranches under the
Stock Raising Homestead Act of 191644 have opened their holdings and
way of life to invasion in the age of coal-bed methane development.45
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of
Amoco Production Company v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe46 and illus-
trated the nature of "life among the ruins." The Southern Ute Tribe had
sued Amoco and a variety of other private parties extracting coal-bed
methane gas out of lands in which the tribe owned the rights to "coal.
4 7
The case was heralded as a struggle between oil and gas companies and
an impoverished Indian tribe.48 Law professors love the case because its
holding turns on the meaning of the word "coal."49 More significantly
for us, the entire dispute-expensive, frustrating and hurtful-arose out
of property-rights allocations made to further long-abandoned federal
policies.50
During the late nineteenth century, the federal government, expend-
ing its energy to sell or give away western lands, made half-hearted ef-
forts to reserve valuable mineral lands. The 1864 Coal Lands Act 5' and
the 1873 Coal Lands Act52 set a maximum limit of 160 acres for individ-
ual entry on coal lands and minimum purchase prices of ten dollars to
39. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS
xii, 241, 248-49 (2005).
40. See Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152, 1155 (Colo. 2003).
41. See, e.g., sources cited, supra note 29.
42. See Wilkinson, supra note 29, at 28-74.
43. See generally RABAN, supra note 18; EGAN, supra note 32, at 237-41.
44. Enlarged Homestead Acts (Stock-Raising Homestead Act), ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 (1916)
(codified in 43 U.S.C. §§ 299, 301 (2000)).
45. See Ray Ring, Backlash: Local Governments Tackle an In-Your-Face Rush on Coalbed
Methane, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 2, 2002, http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?
article id= 1371. See generally M. Kristeen Hand & Kyle R. Smith, Comment, The Deluge: Poten-
tial Solutions to Emerging Conflicts Regarding On-Lease Surface Damage Caused by Coal Bed
Methane Production, 1 WYO. L. REV. 661, 667-68 (2001).
46. 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
47. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 865-66.
48. See id. at 865.
49. See id. at 865-66.
50. See id. at 868, 879-80.
51. Coal Lands Act of 1864, ch. 205, §§ 2-4, 13 Stat. 343, 343-44.
52. Coal Lands Act of 1873, ch. 279, §§ 1-6, 17 Stat. 607.
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twenty dollars an acre.53 With the dawn of the twentieth century came
claims of "widespread fraud" in the disposition of coal lands and dire
threats of a "coal famine. 54
In 1906, by executive order, President Theodore Roosevelt re-
sponded to these concerns of fraud and resource famine by withdrawing
64 million acres of potential coal lands from the operation of the federal
disposal laws.5 5 Homesteaders, who had entered the land and worked it
in good faith, were to be deprived of any chance of ever receiving title to
the lands they occupied.
6
In 1909 and 1910, Congress enacted a legislative compromise re-
serving the "coal" under the lands in question for the federal government
and allowing all other rights to pass to the apparently deserving home-
steaders. 7
After the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, s some
of the federal "coal" rights created by the 1909 and 1910 laws were
transferred back to the Southern Ute Tribe from which the land (and
coal) had originally been taken. 9
In the 1990s, using technology Theodore Roosevelt would have
admired, but could not have imagined, the successors in title to the
homesteaders began leasing their land for the extraction of methane gas
from the now Indian-owned coal.6°
In 1999, at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the United States
Supreme Court held that "coal," as conceived by the authors of the Coal
Lands Acts of 1909 and 1910 at the beginning of the twentieth century,
did not include coal bed methane. 6' They explained how the Southern
53. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 868.
54. Id. at 868-69.
55. 41 CONG. REC. 2615 (1907).
56. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 869.
57. Id. at 870. While the 1909 Act allowed the federal government to grant land patents to
those people who had already endeavored to make good-faith entries onto the land, it also reserved
for the United States the right to mine and remove the coal. Id. The 1910 Act similarly reserved the
coal rights for the United States in the remaining coal lands that the government had opened up for
new entry under the provisions of the homestead laws. Id.
58. Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act) of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codi-
fied in 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (2000)).
59. Amoco, 526 U.S. at 870. The Court said:
Among the lands patented to settlers under the 1909 and 1910 Acts were former reserva-
tion lands of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, which the Tribe had ceded to the United
States in 1880 in return for certain allotted lands provided for their settlement. (citation
omitted) In 1938, the United States restored to the Tribe, in trust, title to the ceded reser-
vation lands still owned by the United States, including the reserved coal in lands pat-
ented under the 1909 and 1910 Acts. As a result, the Tribe now has equitable title to the
coal in lands within its reservation settled by homesteaders under the 1909 and 1910
Acts.
Id.
60. See id. at 870-71.
61. Id at 880.
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Utes ended up with certain rights in the "bundle of rights" to the lands at
issue.62 However, resolving a modem dispute within the frame of refer-
ence created by an ancient compromise (two compromises, if you count
the Indian Reorganization Act) bothered them not at all.
I. THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION
We all-Indian nations, environmentalists, public land managers,
city planners, ranchers, developers and farmers-live with bits of the
collective property ownership problem. This realization, in itself, has
some value. At least we can commiserate. But does this realization pro-
vide a path to a collective solution of some kind?
An obvious candidate for "agent of positive change"-a necessary
but insufficient condition for a solution-is the land trust community.
I define that community broadly to include private land trusts (in-
ternational, national, regional and local) and government entities (fed-
eral, state, tribal and local) committed to preserving and promoting vari-
ous public values by buying-up property rights related to land and water.
These are people who transfer property rights in the interest of preserv-
ing environmental, historical, and cultural value.
By law, land trusts must be government or non-profit entities com-
mitted to the public good.63 State conservation easement statutes gener-
ally allow these two types of entities to hold development rights for
someone else's land for purposes of preservation. 64 Generally, conserva-
tion easements can only be created and enforced for specific beneficial
purposes. For example, the Uniform Conservation Easement Act only
authorizes conservation easements:
[T]the purposes or powers of which include retaining or protecting
natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring the
availability of real property for agricultural, forest, recreational, or
open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhanc-
ing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, ar-
chaeological, or cultural aspects of real property."
' 65
62. See id. at 879-80.
63. Jane Prohaska, Outline: Conservation Easement Drafting, SL053 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 219, 221
(2005).
64. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, § 1(2) (1982). The model statute provides
further clarification on two types of entities:
'Holder' [of a Conservation Easement] means: (i) a governmental body empowered to
hold an interest in real property under the laws of this State or the United States; or (ii) a
charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, the purposes or powers
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Land trusts have a broad range of tools for conveying property in-
terests to meet their goals and, in recent decades, an impressive record of
making transactions happen.66  According to the National Land Trust
Census, as of 2003, local and regional land trusts now protect more than
9.4 million acres of open space, in addition to the millions of acres na-
tional land trusts protect; 67 this is a 100% increase over the 4.7 millions
acres protected in 1998.68 As of 2003, more than five million of these
acres were protected by conservation easements, almost 266% more than
in 1998.69
Who better than the land trust community to reorder the jumble of
property rights around us into something that reflects our current values
and priorities? It is only by the voluntary transfer of property rights that
the problems created by the current property configuration can be made
better.
But wait a second! Rather than being "part of the solution" isn't the
land trust community actually "part of the problem"? 70 Their activities,
authorized and shaped by state and federal statute and subsidized by state
and federal tax law or tax revenue, can be seen as another example of
transitory government priorities manipulating perpetual property rights.7'
A number of scholars have pointed out the "problem of perpetu-
ity' '72 in the work of the land trust community. Generally, the restrictions
imposed through land conservation transactions are perpetual. Whether
the land trust community protects land by accepting a conservation
easement that restricts future development of land or by accepting fee
title to land, history strongly suggests that the effects of the property
transactions will outlast the desires of the grantor of those property rights
and probably outlast the vision that inspired the land trust to which the
66. See Land Trust Alliance, About LTA: Our History, http://www.lta.org/aboutlta/
history.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2006); Jessica E. Jay, Land Trust Risk Management of Legal Defense
and Enforcement of Conservation Easements: Potential Solutions, 6 ENVIT. LAW. 441, 451 (2000).
67. Land Trust Alliance, National Land Trust Census, http://www.lta.org/aboutlta/census.
shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
71. See Duncan M. Greene, Comment, Dynamic Conservation Easements: Facing the Prob-
lem of Perpetuity in Land Conservation, 28 U. SEATTLE L. REV. 883, 901-05 (2005).
72. See, e.g., id; Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the
Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 756 (2002); Gerald Komgold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes:
A Policy Analysis in the Context ofln Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433
(1984); Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.11, cmt. a (2000). This section states:
It is inevitable that, over time, changes will take place that will make it impracticable or
impossible for some conservation servitudes to accomplish the purpose they were de-
signed to serve. If no conservation or preservation purpose can be served by continuance
of the servitude, the public interest requires that courts have the power to terminate the
servitude so that some other productive use may be made of the land.
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rights are granted. 73 Arguably, the well-meant activities of the land trust
community will consign our grandchildren to "life among the ruins" in
the same way that the allotment acts, railroad grants and mining claims
of the nineteenth century force us to live among the ruins. Are we mak-
ing the same mistake again?
The answer to this question is complicated. The complete answer
requires transaction-by-transaction empirical research work that, to my
knowledge, has not yet been undertaken.74 But, I have to say that I think
the answer is "no."
While generalizations are dangerous, particularly in the absence of
much data, there is one common characteristic of almost all of the agents
of the land trust community that suggests they may do more good than
harm in the effort to create a property landscape that conforms to the
needs and aspirations of the people who live on the land. That character-
istic is (for want of a better phrase) "local-ness": the concern of the in-
terests of the people in relatively small geographic areas and the land-
scapes in those areas.
The property ownership configurations we contend with today are
the result of sweeping national determinations about who should own
what, where and how. Congress (and occasionally state legislatures),
through mining legislation, land legislation, private land title confirma-
tion legislation, Indian legislation, transportation legislation, water de-
velopment legislation, and economic relief legislation, built property
rights "creating and destroying machines." Once those machines were
released on the landscape, creating and destroying property rights by
adjudication or by rule, Congress had little power to control them and,
generally, little interest in controlling them.
What the land trust community does works in a very different way.
Transactions are undertaken one at a time. Whether the parties to the
transactions are public or private, whether funding comes from the gov-
ernment, private parties or tax incentives, the land trust community re-
makes ownership patterns on the landscape by one parcel and by one
decision at a time.75
73. See Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1077
(1996).
74. But see Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Ease-
ments, 29 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 421, 426-27 (2005). The "problem of perpetuity" is neither new
nor unique to land trusts and their activities. The legal doctrine of cy pres has been developed and
refined over the centuries to deal precisely with the issue presented by acquisitions of land and
conservation easements by land trusts - how to adjust when the charitable purpose to which property
has been "perpetually" devoted becomes obsolete due to changed conditions. Id.
75. See generally BILL BIRCHARW, NATURE'S KEEPERS (2005) (describing the origins of The
Nature Conservancy).
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I think this characteristic is a cause for hope. The land legislation of
the past was enacted largely by people of good will intended to solve
perceived problems. The wrong they did arose largely from their use of
durable tools (property rights) on landscapes they barely knew and their
addiction to the glory of solving problems and making choices on a na-
tional scale. The "local-ness" which is a hallmark for the land trust
community was largely, if not entirely, absent from the property rights
generating and destroying machines that created the problems we see
around us. Those particular titans among the "lords of yesterday" 76 al-
most universally suppressed local concerns in favor of national ones. If
we turn that bias around, maybe we can get somewhere.
II. LOCAL-NESS
Here and there across the West, the land trust community has taken
up the challenge of reshaping the ownership regimes of the past into
something corresponding to modem values and priorities. When they
have done so, they have done so on a local level, concerned primarily
with communities of human users and the health of the land itself.
In the first years of the twenty-first century, the Trust for Public
Lands (TPL), in cooperation with local land trusts and the United States
Forest Service conceived the "Sierra Checkerboard Initiative." 7  A
swath of the West was "checker-boarded" to finance the Transcontinen-
tal Railroad.78 The checkerboard land ownership pattern is still dominant
in a section of the most valued and most used mountain landscape in the
continental United States, California's Sierra Nevada. Between the south
fork of the American River and the North Yuba River, east of the bur-
geoning "gold country" cities of Auburn, Grass Valley, Nevada City and
Yuba City, TPL and its partners hope to fill in the checkerboard to sus-
tain a permanently protected landscape.79
The Science Assessment for the Sierra Checkerboard Initiative, re-
leased by The Conservation Biology Institute in the summer of 2005,
estimates that between 400,000 and 70,000 acres of private land (held by
successors to the Central Pacific Railroad) will need to be protected in
one form or another to protect the biological assets of the northern Si-
erra.
8 0
76. See WILKINSON, supra note 29, at 3-27.
77. Angela Ballard, Closing the Checkerboard, LAND & PEOPLE, Spring 2005,
http://www.tpl.org (follow "publications" hyperlink; then follow "Land & People magazine" hyper-
link; then follow "Land & People Spring 2005" hyperlink).
78. See supra Part I.A.
79. See Ballard, supra note 77.
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Writings about the Sierra Checkerboard Initiative, whether scien-
tific8' or popular,82 are about "the place" itself, not about Forest Service
policy, railroads, California's population or any other larger "national"
issue.
The Navajo Nation established a Land Acquisition fund in 1984.83
"The fund was intended to consolidate the Navajo land base by purchas-
ing allotted lands, expand the land base for more grazing and home-site
areas, create economic development opportunities and to relieve crowded
areas to make land available for the growing Navajo population. 84 The
fund currently contains $37 million.85 According to Navajo President
Joe Shirley, Jr., within ten years that amount is expected to grow, giving
the Navajo Nation huge buying power and enabling it to spend at least
$10 million per year on land purchases. 86 The President's recent state-
ment expressed interest in purchasing nine specific parcels amounting to
more than 22,000 acres.8 7 Almost all of those parcels are in the checker-
board reservation.
88
In two major projects in Colorado, the Trust for Public Land is try-
ing to organize coalitions to put back together what the General Mining
Act of 1872 tore to pieces. To provide prospectors with incentives to
locate valuable mineral deposits on the public land, the 1872 law granted
them the power purchase lands on which they had found such deposits at
bargain basement prices ($2.50 to 5.00 per acre).8 9 In the "high elk cor-
ridor" near Marble, Colorado and in the Mosquito Range behind Fair-
play, Colorado, TPL is "doing deals" to place hundreds of long aban-
doned mining claims back into public ownership. 90 This, they hope, will
eventually provide an ownership regime that supports the current uses of
these lands, recreation and preservation.
In southeastern Colorado, in the much neglected short-grass prairie
country, lies the Comanche National Grassland. According to the federal
government, the Comanche National Grassland includes over 440,000
81. See, e.g., id.
82. See, e.g., Ballard, supra note 77.
83. Press Release, The Navajo Nation, Navajo Nation President Joe Shirley, Jr. Defends Land







89. See WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 48.
90. Trust for Public Land, Mosquito Range Heritage Initiative, http://www.tpl.org (enter
"Colorado" in "Select by State" box; click on "Mosquito Range Heritage Initiative" hyperlink) (last
visited Apr. 7, 2006); Trust for Public Land, High Elk Corridor campaign, http://www.tpl.org (enter
"Colorado" in "Select by State" box; click on "High Elk Corridor Campaign" hyperlink) (last visited
Apr. 7, 2006).
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acres. 91 Those acres are spread almost helter-skelter across Otero, Las
Animas and Baca counties.
From the 1880s, the Homestead Act and its relatives encouraged
settlement on to the short grass prairie lands of eastern Colorado.
92
Towns were established and quickly boomed. Successive episodes of
blizzard, drought and commodity price collapse, and the Dust Bowl of
the 1930s, drove many of those settlers or their children off the land. To
stabilize soil conditions and provide some financial relief, the federal
government bought some of the land back.93 It was another twenty years
before the federal government conceded that these acquisitions were not
temporary and began managing the patchwork prairie holdings as na-
tional grasslands.94 The random nature of government acquisition makes
the grasslands extremely hard to manage. 95
The mission of the Southern Plains Land Trust (SPLT), headquar-
tered in Pritchett, Colorado, just north of the Comanche Grassland hold-
ings, "is to create a shortgrass prairie reserve network that enables native
plant and animal communities to once again thrive, with minimal human
intervention." 96  As SPLT makes clear: "Though our National Grass-
lands hold the greatest promise for large scale prairie preservation, the
U.S. Forest Service remains the greatest obstacle to that goal. 97 SPLT's
first acquisition is "approximately 14 miles west of the town of Spring-
field in southeastern Colorado. The 1,280 acres known as Fresh Tracks
is three miles north of the Comanche National Grasslands. 98
III. MAJOR CONCERNS
A. State Laws
Western environmentalists and western Indian nations share many
characteristics, among these are an abiding presumption that the federal
government, despite all its flaws, is an ally and the reciprocal presump-
tion that states and local actors are, by and large, adversaries. History
bares this out, and history is not to be discounted.
91. USDA Forest Service, Comanche National Grassland-Area Information,
http://www.fs.fed.us/r2/psicc/coma/main/areainformation.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
92. See supra Part I.
93. See U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, supra note 33.
94. See id.
95. See Elizabeth Howard, Management of the National Grasslands, 78 N.D. L. REv. 409,
425-27 (2002) (describing the confusing and conflicting management attempts that the Forest Ser-
vice has attempted to implement, and the lack of a clear roadmap for future management of the
national grasslands).
96. Southern Plains Land Trust, About SPLT, http://www.southemplains.org/aboutsplt.org
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
97. Southern Plains Land Trust, SPLT's Mission, http://www.southernplains.org/aboutsplt.org
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
98. Southern Plains Land Trust, Fresh Tracks, http://www.southernplains.org/freshtracks.html
(last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
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Relying on land conservation transactions to remake the landscape
of western ownership means relying, to some degree, on state law. State
law is not without its biases. Conservation easement statutes are no ex-
ception. While every western state conservation easement statute author-
izes private non-profits (including environmental groups) to hold conser-
vation easements for purposes of environmental and historical preserva-
tion, only a few statutes specifically recognize the right of the native
people to use conservation easements to preserve their heritage or recog-
nize the right of tribal entities to hold conservation easements.
99
Arizona's conservation easement statute defines a conservation
easement as an easement created to serve a variety of public purposes
"[p]ursuant to a clearly delineated federal, state or local governmental
conservation policy" but makes no reference to tribal government con-
servation policies.100 Arizona defines the holder of a conservation ease-
ment to include "[a] governmental body empowered to hold an interest in
real property under the laws of this state or the United States."'' Again,
the language omits tribes.
Colorado and Utah allow a conservation easement to be held "by a
governmental entity" without further detail.1
0 2
Alaska, Idaho, South Dakota, and Texas, in various forms of the
Uniform Conservation Easement Act, define a holder of a conservation
easement to include "[a] governmental body empowered to hold an inter-
est in real property under the laws of this state or the United States.
'' 03
Again, tribes are omitted.
Nevada defines a holder to include "[a] governmental body empow-
ered to hold an interest in real property,"' 4 neither including nor exclud-
ing tribal entities.
California and Oregon specifically recognize tribal holders of con-
servation easements. California defines the holders of conservation
easements to include "[a] federally recognized California Native Ameri-
can tribe or a non-federally recognized California Native American tribe
that is on the contact list maintained by the Native American Heritage
Commission to protect a California Native American prehistoric, ar-
chaeological, cultural, spiritual, or ceremonial place ... ,,0 Oregon
99. For a discussion of conservation easement statutes as a protector of Native American
sacred sites, see Lawrence Kueter & Christopher S. Jensen, Conservation Easements: An Underde-
veloped Tool to Protect Cultural Resources, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1057 (2006).
100. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-271-2(c)(ii) (20006).
101. Id. § 33-271-3(a) (2006).
102. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-30.5-104(2) (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-18-3
(West 2005).
103. ALASKA STAT. § 34.17.060 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 55-2101 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 1-19B-56 (2005); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 183.001 (2005).
104. NEV. REV. STAT. 111.410 (2005).
105. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.39(c) (West 2005).
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defines the holder of a conservation easement to include "[a]n Indian
tribe as defined [by Oregon statute].' ' 6
Hawaii authorizes "[a]ny public body" to hold a conservation ease-
ment. 10 7 And, Hawaii, alone, specifically authorizes conservation ease-
ments to "[p]reserve and protect the structural integrity and physical ap-
pearance of cultural landscapes, resources, and sites which perpetuate
indigenous native Hawaiian culture."'
10 8
If California, Hawaii and Oregon can do it, why can't any other
western state? 109 Does the fact that conservation easement statutes in
California, Oregon and Hawaii specifically reference indigenous values
or tribal easement holders, mean that statutes in other states' statutes
must be construed as omitting them?
Why would tribal governments want to hold conservation ease-
ments under state law? Efforts to protect tribal culture and values extend
beyond the recognized boundaries of tribal jurisdiction. As the United
States Supreme Court made clear in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation," 0 the holes in Indian ownership
caused by the allotment laws can tear holes in Indian jurisdiction."'
Conservation easements have become important land use regulation tools
in communities, like Boulder, Colorado, with comprehensive zoning
codes.112 Conservation easements could become important land use
regulation tools to allow tribal control of non-Indian land within and
around Indian reservations, but only if it is clear that tribal governments
can hold them and hold them for Indian purposes.
B. Should We Purchase Property Rights to Protect What We Should be
Able to Protect Without Buying Anything?
One of the perennial arguments in the non-Indian land trust com-
munity is to what degree government entities should be willing to pay
(by purchasing conservation easements and other property rights) to pro-
tect public values, when they have the power to protect those public val-
ues through regulation without compensating the land owner who might
injure them. As John Echeverria puts it:
106. OR. REv. STAT. § 271.715 (2005).
107. HAw. REV. STAT. § 198-3 (2005).
108. Id. § 198-1 (2005). See also Jocelyn B. Garovoy, 'Ua Koe Ke Kuleana 0 Na Kanaka'
(Reserving the Rights of Native Tenants): Integrating Kuleana Rights and Land Trust Priorities in
Hawaii, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 523 (2005) (describing kuleana lands in the context of conserva-
tion land trusts).
109. A Westlaw search carried out in March 2006 identified only California, Hawaii, and
Oregon as states whose conservation easement statutes reference Native American, Indian, or in-
digenous peoples.
110. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
111. See Brendale, 492 U.S. at 422.
112. See generally, Boulder County Colorado, Land Use Department,
http://www.co.boulder.co.us/lu (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (describing Boulder's land use planning).
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[R]egulation and payment cannot simply be viewed as alternative
means for advancing a single overarching goal. Rather, how and
when one tool is used will affect how and when the other tool can be
used, both as a matter of social policy and ultimately, too, as matter
of law. In particular, use of public and private resources to pursue
various conservation goals threatens to weaken society's capacity to
pursue the same or similar goals through regulation. At worst, wide-
spread use of the payment approach has the ironic potential to un-
dermine the cause of environmental protection itself by undermining
a time-tested and effective tool for protecting land.
11 3
This concern about payment and regulation applies in the Indian
context and in the non-Indian one. Will paying non-Indian landowners
to get back land originally unjustly taken from Indian tribes both con-
vince other similarly situated land owners that they too are entitled to
payment and undercut moral claims regarding Indian ownership of the
land?
I believe this is a false dichotomy. Most successful regulatory ef-
forts, no matter how worthy in their own right, have been facilitated with
significant subsidies. If the government wants everyone to paint their
house purple, it is wise to provide purple paint at low cost. Direct subsi-
dies, for example, for water treatment plants, 14 brown-fields redevelop-
ment ll5 and mine land clean-up, 1 6 or indirect subsidies like federal fund-
ing for light rail or reorganization bankruptcy protection for liable parties
under CERCLA (the superfund law),'"' make it easier to get people to do
what regulations require.
In the American West, where the federal government had a hand in
creating most of our land use messes, the line between government sub-
sidies to facilitate regulation and government payments for past respon-
sibilities becomes blurry in the extreme. In all of our checkerboards (real
and metaphorical), the government is not only the sovereign, but it is also
113. John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying To Achieve Conservation Purposes, SJ053
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1141, 1145-46 (2004).
114. The Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF), "provides $4 billion annual in recent
years to fund water quality protection projects for wastewater treatment, nonpoint source pollution,
and watershed and estuary management." U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Clean Water
State Revolving Fund: America's Largest Water Quality Financing Source,
http://www.epa.gov/owm/cwfimance/cwsrf/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2006).
115. Three EPA financing programs-EPA's flagship effort-have been used extensively to
spur brownfield redevelopment. The Brownfield Revitalization Act authorizes up to $200 million
annually for EPA's site assessment, cleanup, and revolving loan fund capitalization programs (al-
though Congress to date has not provided more than $123 million for these programs and related
operations and support). U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS FEDERAL
PROGRAMS GUIDE (Sept. 2004), http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/partners/
federalprogramsguide.pdf.
116. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, AML Site Information,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/aml/amlsite/index.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (describ-
ing abandoned mine land cleanup priority sites throughout the United States).
117. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) (Superfund Act), Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767.
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a property owner. It hardly seems wrong to force the federal government
to subsidize solutions to problems it created.
CONCLUSION
This caution aside, however, the prospects look good. The land trust
community seems unlike the property rights manipulators of the past. It
seems better suited to solving problems by addressing local problems on
the landscapes on which it operates. We should all make time to gather
some information and give it some thought.
